Discussion about this post

User's avatar
Jack Jordan's avatar

James Madison would (and does) strongly support the reforms you propose (and the actions of those opposing the partisan gerrymandering taking place in Texas).

In The Report of 1800, Madison emphasized that we must consider exercises of power by our public servants “with a reverence for our constitution, in the true character in which it issued from the sovereign authority of the people.”

"[A] frequent recurrence to fundamental principles [in our constitutions] is solemnly enjoined by most of the state constitutions, and particularly by our own [Constitution], as a necessary safeguard against the danger of degeneracy to which republics are liable . . . . The authority of constitutions over governments, and of the sovereignty of the people over constitutions, are truths which are at all times necessary to be kept in mind; and at no time perhaps more necessary than at the present."

"In the United States [ ] The people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty. The legislature, no less than the executive, is under limitations of power. Encroachments are regarded as possible from the one, as well as from the other. Hence in the United States, the great and essential rights of the people are secured against legislative, as well as against executive [and judicial] ambition. They are secured, not [only] by laws paramount to prerogative; but by constitutions paramount to laws."

Much earlier, in The Federalist Papers, Madison also emphasized that the people are sovereign to help persuade the people to ratify our Constitution. In one of Madison’s earliest and most important elaborations on our Constitution, in January 1788 in Federalist No. 46, he emphasized this reason for federalism, i.e., the division of jurisdictions or powers between state and federal governments, and for all political power:

Partisans too often "seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments [federal and state governments], not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments [state versus federal], whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents."

Seeing the people as sovereign helps see the relevance here of the following in Federalist No. 43 and in Federalist No. 59 (pertaining specifically to federal regulation of state elections):

Federalist No. 43:

Questions about these reforms should be "answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature" which "declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed."

Federalist No. 59:

"EVERY GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION. Every just reasoner will, at first sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in the work of the convention [our Constitution]; and will disapprove every deviation from [this rule except to the extent such deviation was] dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the work [our Constitution] some particular ingredient, with which a rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible."

Clearly and emphatically, our Constitution was designed to secure to the sovereign people the means of preservation of our own sovereignty. One of the greatest privileges of citizenship is the power to choose our own representatives (securing the power to give, withhold or withdraw our consent to be governed by particular people).

Expand full comment
Adam Harper's avatar

There’s a traditional view that tries explains why small groups can hijack politics: coordination is costly, requiring time, energy, and resources. What’s striking today is that with social media - and now AI - the cost of producing, coordinating, and sharing ideas is lower than ever. What’s costly isn’t speaking, but being heard. In an attention economy, the scarce resource is people’s time to listen. So the “Olson phenomenon” persists not because communication is hard to send, but because attention is so hard to command. This insight might suggest that part of the antidote might be to design institutions that slow down, rather than accelerate, deliberation - even in a fast-paced and complex liberal society.

This connects directly to another point about parties, made by Jurgen Habermas, a German writer. Like all of of civil society, parties mediate the attention economy by simplifying choices, curating issues, and channeling diffuse opinion into a coherent political "menu." They act as transmission belts that carry communicative power from the individual into the state. But unlike voluntary associations, parties are bound up with state power; when they become too tightly bound, they risk distorting rather than mediating, filtering public opinion through partisan imperatives instead of representing it. Another feather in the hat for some of the party reforms you suggest...

Expand full comment

No posts