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Charles E. Smith's avatar

Of course, Paine was drawing from earlier instances of English history as Danielle refers to, and which were commented on during an earlier era by John Locke. While he is most cited in support of the natural liberties of man unrestrained by government, his entire argument rested upon man leaving the state of nature by agreeing to a common framework of government and laws that everyone would be judged by--paraphrasing--that everyone would in this transition delegate their own individual freedoms to a common magistrate who would render justice under these laws, as they retained their individual natural rights in case of tyranny. If, on the other hand, a people ceded that “absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator” to an individual ruler, they would inevitably find “they have disarmed themselves, and armed him to make prey of them when he pleases.” Therefore, under a commonwealth or republican form of government, “the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates.” Otherwise, “they shall have armed one or a few men” to govern them via their “sudden thoughts” or “unknown wills without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions.”

Jason Edwards's avatar

This is the kind of structural analysis I've been hoping to see. The "one person decides" framing cuts straight to the problem.

But here's what I keep running into when I think about this: Congress could stop executive overreach. They have the constitutional tools. They're choosing not to use them.

Your piece diagnoses the shift from legislative to executive power, but there's something deeper happening—it's not just systematic erosion, it was deliberate consolidation (https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-architecture-of-executive-power). And now individual members of Congress benefit personally or politically from not doing their institutional job.

When Trump uses some Justice Department interpretation to bypass Congress on Venezuela, Congress could just... change the law. Strip that interpretation. Reassert their authority. They won't, because:

Members who support Trump don't want to limit "their guy"

Members who oppose Trump would rather campaign on outrage than actually govern

Everyone's optimizing for their next election, not for institutional integrity

This is what I keep circling back to: What happens when people aren't doing what they're supposed to do? Not because of capture by external forces, but because personal/party incentives override institutional role?

The reforms you're proposing—fixing primaries, expanding Congress, cabinet secretaries in legislature—these attack the incentive problem. Which is right. But I think there's a missing piece: we don't have any institution whose job is to maintain the constitutional architecture itself.

We professionalized monetary policy with the Fed because we learned you can't leave it to whoever's in power. Maybe governance architecture needs the same treatment—professional staff whose job is designing and maintaining the system, insulated from the very incentives that are currently breaking it.

I don't know if that's the right answer. But the question keeps nagging at me: if Congress won't do its job because the incentives are wrong, how do we fix the incentives?

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